BACKTESTING EXPECTED SHORTFALL

Introducing three model-independent, non-parametric back-test methodologies for Expected Shortfall

By Carlo Acerbi and Balazs Szekely
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

When RiskMetrics announced Value-at-Risk (VaR) as its stated measure of risk in 1996, it initiated an industry standard for institutional risk management which was quickly adopted by the Basel Committee. By 1998, academic researchers began to critique VaR as a risk measure with structural drawbacks, saying it should be replaced by a statistically coherent method. In 2001, an alternative was proposed: Expected Shortfall (ES). Practitioners worldwide adopted ES in parallel with VaR, citing how ES could detect tail risk and offered better mathematical properties for portfolio risk aggregation (i.e., sub-additivity).

For the next 15 years, academic debates over VaR versus ES often reached impassioned levels. During this era, Barra and Riskmetrics both introduced ES in their analytics toolkit, leaving it up to clients to choose between VaR or ES. Until recently, VaR was the measure required by regulators.

However, in October 2013, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a fundamental overhaul of its bank trading-book rules after finding discrepancies among banks, in an effort to capture the types of losses lenders might suffer in a period of significant financial stress. Part of this proposal was to change the measurement method for calculating losses from the usual method of VAR to an alternative known as “Expected Shortfall” which regulators believed will better capture the extreme losses that can occur during times of systemic turmoil.

This proposal was criticized though because a research paper published in 2011 had demonstrated that Expected Shortfall (ES) does not possess a mathematical property called elicitability, leading people to believe that that Expected Shortfall could not be back-tested, either.

In this white paper, we join the debate over Expected Shortfall versus VaR by introducing three model-independent, non-parametric back-test methodologies for Expected Shortfall, which we find more powerful than today’s standard Basel VaR test. Our three Expected Shortfall back-test’s generally require the storage of more information, but we find no conceptual limitations nor computational difficulties. In fact, one of the proposed back tests does not require any additional storage of data from a normal VaR back-test. In addition, we affirm that elicitability has to do with model selection and not model testing, making it almost irrelevant for choosing a regulatory risk standard.
Backtesting Expected Shortfall

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Abstract

The discovery in 2011 that the Expected Shortfall (ES) is not elicit-able, diffused the erroneous belief that it could not be backtested. This misconception aroused a number of criticisms to the recent decision of the Basel Committee to adopt ES in spite of VaR. We contribute to this debate in various ways. First of all, we introduce three model-free, nonparametric backtest methodologies for Expected Shortfall which are shown to be more powerful than the Basel VaR test. These tests generally require the storage of more information, but introduce no conceptual limitations nor computational difficulties of any sort. One of the proposed tests doesn’t even require the storage of additional data. Secondly, we observe that elicitability has in fact to do with model selection and not with model testing, and is therefore irrelevant for the choice of a regulatory risk standard. Finally, we show that ES can in practice be jointly elicited with VaR, but while this may turn out to be a useful result for model selection purposes, we remain convinced that it will not impact the regulatory debate in any respect.

“Eliciwhat?”

Risk professionals had never heard of elicitability until 2011, when [13] proved that Expected Shortfall (ES) is not elicitable as opposed to Value at Risk (VaR). This result sparked a confusing debate.

Put it simply, a statistics ψ(Y) of a random variable Y is said to be elicitable if it minimizes the expected value of a scoring function S:

ψ = arg minxE[S(x, Y)]

Given a history of point predictions xt for the statistics and realizations yt of the random variable, this provides a natural way to evaluate the forecast model, by requiring that the mean score

S = 1T T t=1 S(xt, yt)

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be as low as possible. The mean and the median represent popular examples, minimizing the mean square and absolute error, respectively. The $\alpha$–quantile, hence $VaR$, is also elicitable, with score function $S(x, y) = ((x > y) - \alpha)(x - y)$, a well known fact in quantile estimation.

The discovery that $ES$ cannot be elicited led many to conclude that $ES$ would not be backtestable (see for instance [8]) and sounded like the formal proof of a fact that had long been suspected. It is a fact that the absence of a convincing backtest has long been the last obstacle for $ES$ on its way to Basel, as prophesied already in [21].

In October 2013, a consultation paper from the Basel Committee [5] opted to replace $VaR$ with $ES$ for determining the capital charge of internal based models, but kept $VaR$ as the measure to backtest in the usual way. The change was criticized, based on the alleged impossibility to backtest $ES$, interpreted as a sign that there’s something inherently wrong with this risk measure altogether.

Not everyone, however, was convinced. If elicitable means backtestable, how about the few but valuable works on $ES$ backtesting, like [14], which concluded that “contrary to common belief, $ES$ is not harder to backtest than $VaR$... Furthermore, the power of the test for $ES$ is considerably higher”? And what should we do with variance, given that it’s not elicitable either? Or why has $VaR$ never been backtested by exploiting its elicitation? At a certain point some dissenting voices started to emerge [11, 20].

In what sense – if any – is it more difficult to backtest $ES$ than $VaR$? Fundamental reasons? Practical aspects? Power of the test? Model risk? To address these questions we introduce some statistical tests for $ES$ and we compare them with $VaR$ backtests. We restrict our choice to tests which are non–parametric and free from distributional assumptions other than continuity, necessary conditions for any application in banking regulation.

## 1 Backtesting $ES$

We adopt a standard hypothesis testing framework for unconditional coverage of $ES$ analogous to the standard Basel $VaR$ setting. We assume that independence of arrival of tail events is tested separately, typically by just visual inspection of $VaR$ exception clusters. This is still the preferred practice in the industry as it provides better insight than proposed tests such as [9, 12].

We assume that every day $t = 1, \ldots, T$, $X_t$ represents a bank’s profit-loss distributed along a real (unknowable) distribution $F_t$ and it is forecasted by a model predictive distribution $P_t$ conditional to previous information used to compute $VaR_{\beta,t}$ and $ES_{\alpha,t}$ as defined by (see [1])

$$ES_{\alpha,t} = -\frac{1}{\alpha} \int_0^\alpha P_t^{-1}(q) dq$$

(1)

The random variables $\bar{X} = \{X_t\}$ are assumed to be independent, but not identically distributed. We do not restrict in any respect the variability of $F_t$ and $P_t$.
over time. We will denote by $\text{VaR}_t$ and $\text{ES}_t$ the value of the risk measures when $X \sim F$.

We assume in what follows that the distributions are continuous and strictly increasing, in which case $\text{ES}$ can be expressed as

$$\text{ES}_{\alpha,t} = -E[X_t | X_t + \text{VaR}_{\alpha,t} < 0]$$

and $\text{VaR}$ is uniquely defined as $\text{VaR}_{\beta,t} = -P^{-1}_t(\beta)$. In real cases, this assumption is completely innocuous.

Without loss of generality in our numerical examples we will use $T = 250$, $\beta = 1\%$ and $\alpha = 2.5\%$, the relevant case in [5]. $\text{ES}_{2.5\%}$ was correctly chosen by the Committee to equal $\text{VaR}_{1\%}$ for Gaussian tails, and penalize heavier tails. This is analogous to replacing 50 with 80 in road signs when switching from mph to km/h.

Our null hypothesis generically assumes that the prediction is correct, while the alternative hypotheses are chosen to be only in the direction of risk underestimation. This is again in line with the Basel $\text{VaR}$ test, which is meant to detect only excesses of $\text{VaR}$ exceptions. We formulate more precise test–specific $H_0$ and $H_1$ below. Concrete examples of $H_1$’s will be analyzed in section 2.2 to compute the power of tests in selected cases, similar to the approach followed in table 1 of [5] for different levels of $\text{VaR}$ coverage mismatch.

### 1.1 Test 1: testing $\text{ES}$ after $\text{VaR}$

Our first test is inspired by the conditional expectation (2), from which we can easily derive

$$E \left[ \frac{X_t}{\text{ES}_{\alpha,t}} + 1 \left| X_t + \text{VaR}_{\alpha,t} < 0 \right. \right] = 0$$

If $\text{VaR}_{\alpha,t}$ has been tested already we can separately test the magnitude of the realized exceptions against the model predictions. Defining $I_t = (X_t + \text{VaR}_{\alpha,t} < 0)$, the indicator function of an $\alpha$–exception, we define the test statistics.

$$Z_1(\bar{X}) = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T} X_t I_t}{N_T} + 1$$

if $N_T = \sum_{t=1}^{T} I_t > 0$.

For this test we choose a null hypothesis

$$H_0 : P_t^{(\alpha)} = F_t^{(\alpha)}, \forall t$$

where $P_t^{(\alpha)}(x) = \min(1, P_t(x)/\alpha)$ is the distribution tail for $x < -\text{VaR}_{\alpha,t}$. The alternatives are

$$H_1 : \text{ES}_{\alpha,t}^{F} \geq \text{ES}_{\alpha,t}, \text{ for all } t \text{ and } > \text{ for some } t$$

$$\text{VaR}_{\alpha,t}^{F} = \text{VaR}_{\alpha,t}, \text{for all } t$$

We also assume that $\text{VaR}_\alpha > 0$ as it happens in a realistic portfolio p&l distribution.
We see that the predicted $VaR_\alpha$ is still correct under $H_1$, in line with the idea that this test is subordinated to a preliminary $VaR$ test. This test is in fact completely insensitive to an excessive number of exceptions as it’s an average taken over exceptions themselves.

Under these conditions $\mathbb{E}_{H_0}[Z_1|N_T > 0] = 0$ and $\mathbb{E}_{H_1}[Z_1|N_T > 0] < 0$ (proposition A.2). So, the realized value $Z_1(\vec{x})$ is expected to be zero, and it signals a problem when it is negative.

Dividing eq. (3) by $ES_{\alpha,t}$ was unnecessary. Normalizing by another statistic of $P_t$ or not normalizing at all, would have given other legitimate tests. Our choice was made to obtain a dimensionless test statistics and to control for heteroscedasticity.

Variations of this test appeared in the literature already several times. For instance, already [18] proposed something similar in a GARCH-EVT context.

1.2 Test 2: testing $ES$ directly

A second test follows from the unconditional expectation

$$ES_{\alpha,t} = -\mathbb{E}\left[\frac{X_t I_t}{\alpha}\right]$$ (5)

that suggests to define

$$Z_2(\vec{X}) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{X_t I_t}{T \alpha \, ES_{\alpha,t}} + 1$$ (6)

Appropriate hypotheses for this test are

$$H_0 : \ P_t^{[\alpha]} = F_t^{[\alpha]} , \ \forall t$$
$$H_1 : \ ES_{\alpha,t}^F \geq ES_{\alpha,t} , \ \text{for all } t \text{ and } > \text{ for some } t$$
$$VaR_{\alpha,t}^F \geq VaR_{\alpha,t} , \ \text{for all } t$$

We have again $\mathbb{E}_{H_0}[Z_2] = 0$ and $\mathbb{E}_{H_1}[Z_2] < 0$ (proposition A.3). Remarkably, these results do not require independence of the $X_t$’s. Furthermore, the test can be immediately extended to general, non–continuous distributions, by replacing $I_t$ with

$$I_t' = (X_t + VaR_{\alpha,t} < 0) + \frac{\alpha \cdot \text{Prob}[X_t + VaR_{\alpha,t} < 0]}{\text{Prob}[X_t + VaR_{\alpha,t} = 0]} (X_t + VaR_{\alpha,t} = 0);$$

see eq. (4.12) in [1].

Test 2 jointly evaluates frequency and magnitude of $\alpha$–tail events as shown by the relationship

$$Z_2 = 1 - (1 - Z_1) \frac{N_T}{T \alpha}$$ (7)

remembering that $\mathbb{E}_{H_0}[N_T] = T \alpha$. 

4
We remark that both tests 1 and 2 might have been defined under the weaker null hypothesis
\[H_0^* : \text{ES}_{F, t} = \text{ES}_{\alpha, t}, \text{ for all } t\]
\[\text{VaR}_{F, t} = \text{VaR}_{\alpha, t}, \text{ for all } t\]
(8)
all the above results holding true. This choice however would have not been sufficient to simulate the test statistics and compute p-values (see section 2).

1.3 Test 3: estimating ES from realized ranks
Following \[10, 7\] it is possible to backtest the tails of a model by checking if the observed ranks \(U_t = P_t(X_t)\) are i.i.d. \(U(0, 1)\) as they should if the model distribution is correct. To convert this idea into a specific test for ES, we must assign to each quantile its dollar importance that depends on the shape of the tail itself. To this purpose, denoting with
\[\bar{E}\text{S}_{\alpha}^{(N)}(\bar{Y}) = -\frac{1}{[N\alpha]} \sum_{i} Y_i: N\]
(9)
an ES estimator based on a vector of \(N\) i.i.d draws \(\bar{Y} = \{Y_i\}\), we define
\[Z_3(\bar{X}) = -\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{\bar{E}\text{S}_{\alpha}^{(T)}(P_t^{-1}(\bar{U}))}{\bar{E}\text{S}_{\alpha}^{(T)}(P_t^{-1}(\bar{V}))} + 1\]
(10)
where \(\bar{V}\) are i.i.d. \(U(0, 1)\). The idea is that the entire vector of ranks \(\bar{U} = \{U_t\}\) is reused to estimate ES in every past day \(t\), and the result is then averaged over the entire period\(^3\). In the denominator we don’t have \(\text{ES}_{\alpha, t}\), but a finite sample estimate to compensate for the bias of estimator (9). The denominator can be computed analytically via
\[\mathbb{E}_V \left[ \frac{\bar{E}\text{S}_{\alpha}^{(T)}(P_t^{-1}(\bar{V}))}{\bar{E}\text{S}_{\alpha}^{(T)}(P_t^{-1}(\bar{V}))} \right] = -\frac{T}{[T\alpha]} \int_0^{1} I_{1-p}(T - [T\alpha], [T\alpha]) P_t^{-1}(p) \, dp\]
(11)
where the function \(I_x(a, b)\) is a regularized incomplete beta function (proposition A.5).

Also in this case \(E_{H_0}[Z_3] = 0\) and \(E_{H_1}[Z_3] < 0\) (proposition A.4). However, the hypotheses involve this time the entire distributions:
\[H_0 : \ P_t = F_t, \ \forall t\]
\[H_1 : \ P_t \succeq F_t, \ \text{for all } t \ \text{and } \succeq \text{ for some } t\]
where \((\succeq)\) \(\succ\) denotes (weak) first order stochastic dominance.

Test 3 is less natural than tests 1 and 2, but it is extremely general. A similar test may be designed for any other conceivable statistics for which an estimator is available.

\(^2\lfloor x \rfloor\) is the integer part of \(x\) and \(Y_{i:N}\) denotes order statistics.

\(^3\)We could as well have chosen just the distribution \(P_{t^*}\) of a specific day, for instance the last one \(t^* = T\).
2 Test Significance and Power

2.1 Significance

For all tests $Z = Z_i$ we simulate the distribution $P_Z$ under $H_0$ to compute the $p$-value $p = P_Z(Z(\vec{x}))$ of a realization $Z(\vec{x})$:

- simulate independent $X_t \sim P_t$, $\forall t, \forall i = 1, \ldots, M$
- compute $Z^i = Z(\vec{X}^i)$
- estimate $p = \sum_{i=1}^M (Z^i < Z(\vec{x}))/M$ (12)

where $M$ is a suitably large number of scenarios. Given a preassigned significance level $\phi$, the test is finally accepted or rejected if $p \geq \phi$.

From the above procedure, we see that while to backtest VaR exceptions it’s sufficient to record a single number $I_t$ per day, to backtest ES it may be necessary to keep memory of the entire predictive distributions $P_t$.

In reality, for $Z_1$ and $Z_2$ it is sufficient to record only the $\alpha$–tail $P_t^{[\alpha]}$ of the predictive distributions, because $X_t I_t$ can be simulated after $I_t \sim \text{Bernoulli}(\alpha)$. We will see in section 2.3 that in fact $Z_2$ lends itself to implementations that do not even require the recording of the predictive distributions.

Storage of more information (a cumulative distribution function per day) is the only difference between backtesting ES and VaR. A practical difference only which poses no technological challenge.

2.2 Power

In the next subsections we run a number of experiments to evaluate the power of the $ES_{2.5\%}$ tests and compare it to the power of the Basel VaR$_{1\%}$ test under selected hypotheses. The examples are based on Student-t distributions which allow to span all possible fat tails indexes. Figure 1 at page 21 shows how to read the results of every experiment. The green vertical lines in the following plots correspond to exactly 5% and 10% significance level, while the black vertical lines are the corresponding closest discrete levels attainable by the VaR test.

The results are summarized in tables in which the left part describes the setup of $H_0$ and $H_1$ and the right part the power of tests. Every row in the tables corresponds to one of the significance levels attainable by the VaR test.

$Z_1$ is not applicable to the examples in which $VaR_{2.5\%}$ varies across the alternatives.

2.2.1 Scaled distributions: ES coverage

We assume that $H_1$ is a rescaled version of the $H_0$ distribution: $F(x) = P(x/\gamma)$, $\gamma > 1$, as shown in figure 2. We assume certain levels of ES coverage mismatch, assuming $ES^{P}_\alpha = ES^{F}_{\alpha'}$ for $\alpha' = 5\%, 10\%$ so that $\gamma = ES^{P}_\alpha / ES^{F}_{\alpha'}$. The results are shown in table 1 and in figures 3 and 4 in which $H_0$ is chosen to be $\nu = 100$ and $\nu = 5$ respectively.
In these cases, $Z_2$ clearly outperforms the $VaR$ test in terms of power. $Z_3$ has instead slightly less power for smaller tail index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\nu$</th>
<th>$\alpha'$ (%)</th>
<th>$VaR_{1%}$</th>
<th>ES_{2.5%}</th>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.36</td>
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<tr>
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Table 1: Power of multiple tests for scaled distributions with different ES coverage as explained in Section 2.2.1.

### 2.2.2 Student-$t$ distributions

We choose $H_1$ to be a Student-$t$ distribution with smaller $\nu$ than $H_0$, see figure 5. Notice that in this way the variance will also be larger, as $\sigma^2 = \nu/(\nu - 2)$.

We analyze $\nu = 100, 10, 5, 3$ in figure 6 and $\nu = 10, 5, 3$ in figure 7. We analyze two $H_0$’s with tail-indexes $\nu = 10, 100$ in table 2.

In this case, $Z_3$ is the most powerful, followed by $Z_2$ and by the $VaR$ test.

### 2.2.3 Normalized Student-$t$ distributions

We repeat the previous experiment using normalized Student-$t$ distributions with unit variance (figure 5). In this case the difference between $H_0$ and $H_1$ is only due to tail properties and not larger variance. The results are reported in figures 9 and 10 and in the bottom half of table 2.

This case is particularly subtle. Both $Z_2$ and the $VaR$ test display very little power at all, with $VaR$ doing slightly better. $Z_3$, on the contrary, performs quite well.

### 2.2.4 Fixed $VaR_{2.5\%}$ Student-$t$ distributions

In order to analyze $Z_1$, we repeat experiments 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 also shifting the $H_1$ distributions in such a way to leave $VaR_{2.5\%}$ unchanged, as in figure 11. The results are reported in table 3 and in figures 12 and 13.
Table 2: Power of multiple tests for varying tail indexes in $H_1$. Student-$t$ (Subsection 2.2.2) and normalized Student-$t$ (Subsection 2.2.3) distributions are investigated.

Also in this case, $Z_2$ and the VaR test display modest power. On the other hand, both $Z_1$ and $Z_3$ perform very well.

2.2.5 Comment to results

In these, and other experiments that have been performed, $Z_2$ has proven the most powerful in the case of alternative hypotheses with different volatility, while $Z_3$ and $Z_1$ were the most powerful in the case of different tail index. The VaR exceptions test is generally significantly less powerful.

2.3 Avoiding storage of predictive distributions for $Z_2$

The critical levels for $Z_2$ display remarkable stability across different distribution types. Table 4 illustrates the levels for 5% and 0.01% significance, the same as in the Basel traffic–light mechanism, for Student-$t$ distributions with different $\nu$ and mean. It is clear that a traffic–light based on $Z_2$ with fixed levels $Z_2^* = -0.7$ and $Z_2^* = -1.8$ would perfectly do in all occasions. Notice that the $\pm 1$ location
Table 3: Power of multiple tests in the experiment of Section 2.2.4 similar to table 2 but with distributions with fixed $VaR_{2.5\%}$.

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<th>$\nu$</th>
<th>$VaR_{1%}$</th>
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<td>79.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Power of multiple tests in the experiment of Section 2.2.4 similar to table 2 but with distributions with fixed $VaR_{2.5\%}$.

shifts span an unrealistically large region for a real profit–loss distribution, which is expected to be centered around zero. Notice also that the thresholds deviate significantly only for dramatically heavy tailed distributions, with $\nu = 3$, and that in this case the proposed test would be more penalizing, which is probably a good thing, given that such tails represent a problem by themselves.

The important fact behind this stability is that for implementing $Z_2$ there is effectively no need to do a MC test and therefore no need to store predictive distributions. Testing $Z_2$ requires to record only two numbers per day, the magnitude $X_t I_t$ of a $VaR_{\alpha,t}$ exception and the predicted $ES_{\alpha,t}$.

3 Back to elicitability

Now that we have seen that elicitability is not necessary for backtesting, we argue something more: elicitability has in fact nothing to do with backtesting.
Table 4: 5% and 0.01% significance thresholds for $Z^2$ across Student-t distributions with different $\nu$ and location

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<th>$\nu$</th>
<th>location</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaussian</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.1 Model selection, not model testing

Elicitability allows to compare in a natural way (yet not the only way) different models that forecast a statistics in the exact same sequence of events, while recording only point predictions. For instance, if a bank A has multiple $VaR$ models in place for its p&l, the mean score can be used to select the best in class. But this is model selection, not model testing. It’s a relative ranking not an absolute validation.

Regulators on the contrary need to validate individual models from different banks on an absolute scale. To this purpose, elicitability is of no use. A hypothesis test based on elicitability would still require either the collection of the predictive distributions or strong distributional assumptions, with no guarantee of better power a priori.

It is then no coincidence that despite $VaR$ being elicitable, $VaR$ backtests are still based on counting exceptions. If these tests are simple and entail the recording of just one number, it’s not because $VaR$ is elicitabile, but because quantiles define a Bernoulli random variable. Any other elicitable statistic simply does not.

3.2 Expectiles

Expectiles [19] have recently attracted a lot of interest (see for instance [17]) because they are the only coherent law–invariant measure of risk which is also elicitable [6, 22]. But if, as we have seen, absence of elicitability is not a serious problem for a regulatory risk standard, absence of comonotonic additivity certainly is. An expectile $\rho$ will tell you that a long position in a call option $C$ is partially hedged by a long (yes, long) position in the underlying stock $S$: $\rho(C + S) < \rho(C) + \rho(S)$. Even $VaR$ would look perplex.

The class of comonotonic additive coherent measures of risk of law–invariant type has been completely classified [15] and coincide with spectral measures of risk [2, 4], which contain $ES$ as the most popular example. Alternative choices that are not law–invariant belong to the realm of stress–test based measures,
which is incidentally the direction the FED seems to be considering with increasing interest.

3.3 Joint elicitability of $ES$ and $VaR$

An intuitive if not rigorous way to understand why $ES$ is not elicitable is to notice that there exists no expression of the type

$$E[L(X, ES)] = 0$$

where $L$ is a function involving only a random variable and its $ES$. If such a function existed we could interpret it as

$$L(X, ES) = \frac{\partial S(X, e)}{\partial e} \bigg|_{e=ES}$$

and integrate it with respect to $e$ to build a scoring function $S$ that elicits $ES$. However, there exist null expectations that involve both $ES$ and $VaR$. For instance

$$E[(X + ES)(X + VaR < 0)] = 0$$

$$E[X(X + VaR < 0) + \alpha ES] = 0$$

(13)

It is therefore clear that if there’s a chance to build a scoring function for $ES$, this needs to involve $VaR$ as well. Starting from the above expressions, it is in fact not difficult to construct a one–parameter family of scoring functions

$$S^W(v, e, x) = \alpha e^2/2 + W\alpha e^2/2 - \alpha ev + (e(v + x) + W(x^2 - v^2)/2) (x + v < 0)$$

(14)

for every $W \in \mathbb{R}$, that jointly elicit $VaR$ and $ES$

$$\{VaR, ES\} = \arg \min_{v,e} E[S^W(v, e, X)]$$

(15)

under the condition that $VaR \cdot W > ES$. Notice that for any fixed $W$ one can imagine a bizarre distribution (e.g. a $\nu = 1 + \epsilon$ Student–t with $\epsilon > 0$ small enough) that violates this condition, so strictly speaking, this is not a mathematical proof of 2–elicitability in the sense of [16], as was proven for variance and mean. However, from a practical point of view, it is easy to choose a value for $W$ large enough for any specific case at hand.

As a side remark, we observe that theoretical results showing that a measure is not elicitable may still not preclude that it is in practice elicitable. We still don’t know whether $VaR$ and $ES$ are jointly elicitable or not, and we wouldn’t be surprised to discover that they are not, but we already know that in practice they are.

We note that this result opens new ways to set up selections for $ES$ models, but in the light of the observations made in 3.1 it does not add anything to $ES$ as a candidate for regulatory standards.
4 Conclusions

ES can be backtested. The most important contribution of our work is to define three ES backtest methods which are non-parametric, distribution independent, and do not assume any asymptotic convergence. The tests are easy to implement and generally display better power than the standard Basel VaR backtest. The only additional complexity they bring about is the necessity to record the predicted cumulative distribution function day by day. This is even unnecessary for $Z_2$, which exhibits a remarkable stability of the critical levels across different tail shapes.

Elicitability of a risk measure is not relevant for an absolute model validation. This property is useful for relative comparison of different models forecasting the same process, namely for model selection. Non elicitation of a risk measure does not preclude the possibility to backtest it efficiently and elicitation of VaR will never provide a better alternative to backtest it by just counting exceptions.

We provide some intuition as to why ES is not individually elicitable. From this fact, we learn how to build a scoring functional that jointly elicits ES and VaR. The result is new and generally important for ES model selection, but we don’t think it will impact, in any respect, the regulatory debate around VaR and ES.

We believe that $Z_1$, together with the standard Basel VaR backtest or alternatively $Z_2$ alone, represent valid proposals to backtest models for ES based regulation. $Z_3$ is also a valid test, but it seems more appropriate as a complementary test to detect tail index mispecification only.

Acknowledgments: We are indebted to Tilmann Gneiting, Dirk Tasche and an anonymous referee for many corrections and enriching discussions. We are grateful to Imre Kondor for spurring this research and for organizing the “International workshop on systemic risk and regulatory market risk measures” in Pullach, where a preliminary version of this work was first presented.
References


A Proofs

We provide the proof to some key results used in the article. First of all we prove the following general Lemma A.1.

Let $X_i, i = 1, \ldots, T$ be i.i.d. draws from a continuous and strictly increasing distribution $F$ and assume $\text{VaR}_\alpha = -F^{-1}(\alpha)$ is known. Denote as usual $I_i = (X_i + \text{VaR}_\alpha < 0)$ and $N_T = \sum_{i=1}^T I_i$. Define the estimator

$$\hat{ES}_\alpha^{(N)}(X) = -\frac{\sum_{i=1}^N X_i I_i}{N_T}$$

if $N_T > 0$.

Then, $\hat{ES}_\alpha^{(N)}(X)$ is a conditionally unbiased estimator of $ES_\alpha(X)$, that is,

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \hat{ES}_\alpha^{(N)}(X) \mid N_T > 0 \right] = ES_\alpha.$$  (17)

Proof: Conditioning first on the $I_i$'s and then using the independence of the $X_i$, we get

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \hat{ES}_\alpha^{(N)} \mid N_T > 0 \right] = \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i} X_i I_i \mid N_T > 0 \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[ \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i} X_i I_i \mid I_1, \ldots, I_T \right] \mid N_T > 0 \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[ -\frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i} I_i \mathbb{E}[X_i \mid I_i] \mid N_T > 0 \right]$$

$$= \mathbb{E} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_{i} I_i ES_\alpha \mid N_T > 0 \right]$$

$$= ES_\alpha.$$

Note that $I_i \mathbb{E}[X_i \mid I_i] = -I_i ES_\alpha$ holds regardless of the value $I_i$. □

We now consider the setting adopted throughout the paper. We denote independent r.v.'s $X_t \sim F_t$ for $t = 1, \ldots, T$. We denote by $ES_{\alpha,t}$ and $\text{VaR}_{\alpha,t}$ the statistics computed from predictive distributions $P_t$, $I_t = (X_t + \text{VaR}_{\alpha,t} < 0)$ the indicator function of a $\text{VaR}$ exception and $N_T = \sum_{t} I_t$ the overall number of exceptions. All distribution functions are assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing. We also assume $\text{VaR}_{\alpha,t} > 0$ and a fortiori $ES_{\alpha,t} > 0$ throughout.

The properties of $Z_1$ are proven below under null hypothesis (8) which is weaker than in section 1.1.
Proposition A.2. In the test hypotheses

\begin{align*}
H_0 & : \quad ES_{\alpha,t}^F = ES_{\alpha,t}, \text{ for all } t \\ 
& \quad VaR_{\alpha,t}^F = VaR_{\alpha,t}, \text{ for all } t \\
H_1 & : \quad ES_{\alpha,t}^F \geq ES_{\alpha,t}, \text{ for all } t \text{ and } \geq \text{ for some } t \\
& \quad VaR_{\alpha,t}^F = VaR_{\alpha,t}, \text{ for all } t
\end{align*}

we have

1. \( \mathbb{E}_{H_0} [Z_1 | N_T > 0] = 0 \)
2. \( \mathbb{E}_{H_1} [Z_1 | N_T > 0] < 0 \)

Proof: 1. Similar to lemma A.1. Assuming \( H_0 \), implies that \( ES_{\alpha,t} = ES_{\alpha,t}^P = ES_{\alpha,t}^F \) and \( I_t = I_t^P = I_t^F \)

\[
\mathbb{E}_{H_0} [Z_1 | N_T > 0] = \mathbb{E}_{H_0} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_t X_t I_t \frac{ES_{\alpha,t}}{1} \bigg| N_T > 0 \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{H_0} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_t X_t I_t \frac{ES_{\alpha,t}}{1} \bigg| I_1, \ldots, I_T \right] + 1 \bigg| N_T > 0 \]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{H_0} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_t I_t \frac{ES_{\alpha,t}}{1} \bigg| N_T > 0 \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{H_0} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_t I_t \frac{ES_{\alpha,t}}{1} \bigg| N_T > 0 \right]
\]

where we have used independence of \( X_t \)'s to condition on a single \( I_t \) only.

2. Let’s assume \( H_1 \). Along the same lines as before, we have

\[
\mathbb{E}_{H_1} [Z_1 | N_T > 0] = \mathbb{E}_{H_1} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_t I_t \frac{ES_{\alpha,t}}{1} \bigg| N_T > 0 \right]
\]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{H_1} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_t I_t \frac{ES_{\alpha,t}}{1} \bigg| I_t^P \right] + 1 \bigg| N_T > 0 \]

\[
= \mathbb{E}_{H_1} \left[ \frac{1}{N_T} \sum_t I_t \frac{ES_{\alpha,t}}{1} \bigg| I_t^P \right]
\]

\[
< 0
\]

Notice that we used the fact that under \( H_1 \) we assume \( VaR_{\alpha,t}^F = VaR_{\alpha,t}^P \) so that \( I_t^P = I_t^P = I_t \). The last step follows from \( ES_{\alpha,t}^F \geq ES_{\alpha,t}^P > 0 \) which holds for all \( t \) and the inequality is strict for some \( t \).

The properties of \( Z_2 \) are proven below under weaker \( H_0 \) than in section 1.2.
Proposition A.3. In the test hypotheses

\[ H_0 : \quad ES_{\alpha,t}^F = ES_{\alpha,t}, \text{ for all } t \]
\[ VaR_{\alpha,t}^F = VaR_{\alpha,t}, \text{for all } t \]
\[ H_1 : \quad ES_{\alpha,t}^F \geq ES_{\alpha,t}, \text{ for all } t \text{ and } > \text{ for some } t \]
\[ VaR_{\alpha,t}^F \geq VaR_{\alpha,t}, \text{for all } t \]

we have

1. \( E_{H_0}[Z_2] = 0 \)
2. \( E_{H_1}[Z_2] < 0 \)

Proof: 1. From identity (5) we have

\[ E_{H_0}\left[\frac{X_t I_t}{\alpha ES_{\alpha,t}} + 1\right] = 0, \forall t \]

The conclusion follows from definition (6).

2. The assumption \( VaR_{\alpha,t}^F \leq VaR_{\alpha,t}^P \) implies that \( I_t^P \leq I_t \). Using this fact and \( X_t < 0 \) if \( I_t = 1 \) (here we use \( VaR_{\alpha,t}^P > 0 \)), we get \( X_t I_t \leq X_t I_t^P \). Taking expectation, we have

\[ E_{H_1}[X_t I_t] \leq E_{H_1}[X_t I_t^P] = -\alpha ES_t^F \leq -\alpha ES_t^P. \]

Under \( H_1 \) the last inequality holds for all \( t \) and it is strict for some \( t \). The conclusion then follows from definition (6).

Remarkably, the previous proposition holds even if the \( X_t \) are not independent.

The properties of \( Z_3 \) follow from

Proposition A.4. In the test hypotheses of section 1.3

1. \( E_{H_0}[Z_3] = 0 \)
2. \( E_{H_1}[Z_3] < 0 \)

Proof: 1. Under \( H_0 \) we have \( U_t = P_t(X_t) \sim U(0,1) \). The conclusion directly follows from the definition (10).

2. Under \( H_1 \), for any fixed \( t \) the variables \( P_t^{-1}(U) \sim P_t \) are stochastically dominated by \( P_t^{-1}(V) \sim P_t \) where \( V \sim U(0,1) \). The estimator \( \hat{ES} \) is consistent with stochastic dominance, so \( E_{H_1}[ES_{\alpha,t}^{(T)}(P_t^{-1}(U))] \geq E_{H_1}[ES_{\alpha,t}^{(T)}(P_t^{-1}(V))] \) for all \( t \) and the inequality is strict for some \( t \). Conclusion then follows directly from definition (10).

We prove the following result on the bias of the \( ES \) estimator
Proposition A.5. Let $Y_i, i = 1, \ldots, n$ be i.i.d. draws from a continuous and strictly increasing distribution $F$. The expected value of the estimator (9) can be expressed as

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\hat{ES}_\alpha^n(Y)\right] = -\frac{n}{n\alpha} \int_0^1 I_{1-p}(n-[n\alpha],[n\alpha]) F^{-1}(p) \, dp$$

where the function $I_x(a,b)$ is a regularized incomplete beta function.

**Proof:** The distribution density of the order statistics $Y_{k,n}$ is given by

$$f_k(y) = n f(y) \binom{n-1}{k-1} F(y)^{k-1}(1-F(y))^{n-k}$$

where $f$ is the density of $F$. Some algebra yields

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\hat{ES}_\alpha^n(Y)\right] = -\frac{1}{n\alpha} \sum_{k=1}^{[n\alpha]} \mathbb{E}[Y_{k,n}]$$

$$= -\frac{1}{n\alpha} \sum_{k=1}^{[n\alpha]} \int y f_k(y) \, dy$$

$$= -\frac{n}{n\alpha} \sum_{h=0}^{[n\alpha]-1} \binom{n-1}{h} \int y F(y)^h (1-F(y))^{n-h-1} f(y) \, dy$$

$$= -\frac{n}{n\alpha} \int F_B([n\alpha]-1; n-1; F(y)) y f(y) \, dy$$

where $F_B(k;n;p)$ is the cumulative distribution function of a standard binomial distribution. The conclusion follows from the representation $F_B(k;n;p) = I_{1-p}(n-k;k+1)$ and a standard change of integration $f(y) \, dy = dp$. ☐

Finally, we prove eq. (15) on joint elicitability of $ES$ and $VaR$

Proposition A.6. The scoring function (14) jointly elicits $VaR$ and $ES$ in the sense of equation (15) under the condition $W \cdot VaR > ES$

**Proof:** Follows from direct computation. Denoting $\star \equiv \{v = VaR, e = ES\}$ one obtains

$$\left. \frac{\partial}{\partial v} \right|_\star \mathbb{E}[S^W(v,e,X)] = \mathbb{E}[(Wv-e)(\alpha - (X+v < 0))]_\star = 0$$

$$\left. \frac{\partial}{\partial e} \right|_\star \mathbb{E}[S^W(v,e,X)] = \mathbb{E}[\alpha(e-v) + (v+X)(X+v < 0)]_\star = 0$$
and

\[ \frac{\partial^2}{\partial v^2} \bigg|_* E[S^W(v, e, X)] = E[(W v - e)\delta(X + v)]_* = (W VaR - ES)f(-VaR) \]

\[ \frac{\partial^2}{\partial e^2} \bigg|_* E[S^W(v, e, X)] = \alpha \]

\[ \frac{\partial^2}{\partial v \partial e} \bigg|_* E[S^W(v, e, X)] = 0 \]

which also shows that the stationary point is a saddle when the condition is violated.
B   Figures
Figure 1: Power and significance for a test under specific $H_0$ and $H_1$’s. The top plot shows $F(z)$ under $H_0$ and $1 - F(z)$ under $H_1$ for the test variable $Z$. Any vertical line intercepts the two curves at type I probability (the significance level) and type II probability, and displays the test power. The bottom plot shows the densities under $H_0$ and $H_1$; more powerful tests result in more distinct curves.
Figure 2: Scaled distributions
Figure 3: Different ES coverage. $H_0$: Student-$t$ with $\nu = 100$
Figure 4: Different ES coverage. $H_0$: Student-$t$ with $\nu = 5$. 

<table>
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<tr>
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<td>3.36</td>
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<td>H1 $\alpha=5%$, $\gamma=1.2185$</td>
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<td>H1 $\alpha=10%$, $\gamma=1.5298$</td>
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<td>5.38</td>
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Figure 5: Student-\(t\) distributions
Figure 6: Student-$t$ distributions. $H_0$: $\nu = 100$. $H_1$: $\nu = 10, 5, 3$
Figure 7: Student-t distributions. $H_0: \nu = 10$. $H_1: \nu = 5, 3$
Figure 8: Normalized Student-\( t \) distributions
Figure 9: Normalized Student t distributions. H0: $\nu = 100$. H1: $\nu = 10, 5, 3$. 

$H_0: df=100$ | $H_1: df=10$ | $H_1: df=5$ | $H_1: df=3$

- Normalized ES2%: $2.34, 2.35, 2.41, 2.47, 2.62, 2.66$
- Normalized ES2%: $-1.4, -1.2, -1, -0.8, -0.6, -0.4, -0.2$
Figure 10: Normalized Student–$t$ distributions. $H_0: \nu = 10$. $H_1: \nu = 5, 3$
Figure 11: Fixed $VaR_{2.5\%}$ Student-$t$ distributions
Figure 12: Fixed VaR$_{1.5\%}$, Student-$t$ distributions.

$H_0$: $\nu = 100$.

$H_1$: $\nu = 10, 5, 3$.
Figure 13: Fixed VaR$^{2.5\%}$ Student–t distributions. $H_0$: $\nu = 10$. $H_1$: $\nu = 5, 3$
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